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Abstract
Lean production is rapidly displacing conventional mass production at manufacturing
companies in the US and throughout the world. Human resource practices play a critical
role in any company’s program to develop and institutionalize lean methods on the shop
floor. One approach that has been successful at many companies involves organizing
production workers into self-directed work teams. Teams of between five and fifteen
workers take responsibility for an integrated, customer-driven production process. Team
members cross-train in many of the tasks within the defined process, and gradually
expand their capabilities to include administrative and support roles. As the team
matures, it slowly becomes increasingly autonomous, until it functions with minimal
supervision.
Texas Instruments Defense Systems and Electronics Group (TI DSEG) has pioneered the
concept of self-directed work teams. This thesis presents a case study and analysis of two
particular teams at TI DSEG: the Switch Filter/Beam Former Team, and the Diamond
Point Turning Team. Both teams have achieved a high-level of maturity in terms of their
degree of autonomy and the sophistication of their activities. The objectives in studying
these two teams are to highlight the key factors that contributed to their success, to
uncover the pitfalls and roadblocks they encountered along the way, and to document the
organizational structures and operating procedures that support the self-directed team
concept.
Thesis Supervisor:
Janice Klein
Visiting Associate Professor of Management Science
MIT Sloan School of Management
3To my parents, Eileen and Bob Rosson
I am grateful for their constant support
and the strength they gave me to pursue my dreams.
4Acknowledgments
I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Janice Klein for her helpful guidance
throughout the research and writing of this thesis. She contributed a host of invaluable
insights related to the theory and practice of self-directed work teams, and offered many
constructive suggestions to improve the written manuscript. In addition, Professor Klein
showed unlimited patience as she waited for the author to finish a first draft.
I would also like to thank all of the people at Texas Instruments who participated in this
project. In particular, Keith Weiss helped me greatly by identifying several potential
teams that would illustrate the teaming concept well, and by arranging for me to meet
with team members and development staff in the Dallas area. Mr. Weiss also provided
helpful comments on the written report. Team facilitators Jani Cantu and Carl Young,
and team coordinator Barbara McCuin, offered detailed and candid assessments of the
team process at TI DSEG. I also acknowledge the assistance of Fred Eintracht, Jodi Rose,
and Jana White of the High Performing Organizations Development staff. They outlined
the history of teaming at TI and the systems realignment efforts that support the team
initiative.
The most important contribution, however, came from the team members themselves,
who endured hours of relentless questioning from an overzealous graduate student. Their
honest and direct comments form the backbone of the case studies in this thesis. The table
below lists the members of each participating team.
In addition, I would like to thank the Lean Aircraft Initiative at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology for coordinating and sponsoring my research.
Finally, I thank my sister, Julia Small, for proofreading the final draft and offering many
excellent suggestions for improvement.
TI DSEG -- Team Rosters
Switch Filter/Beam Former Team Diamond Point Turning Team
Beverly Gideon Carolyn McCandless Frank Duran Louis Rigney
Birdie Blackwell Juanita Webb Scott Moffitt Mark Kempf
Jay Romero Debbie Emard Ken Brown Rodney Hodge
Sherri Pipkins Sherri Baldwin Gerald Wester Chris Martin
Lori Carter Donna Fields Delois Meredith Troy Kardokus
Judy Jarrell Darrell Breedlove David Davis
5About the Author
Richard D. Rosson will graduate from MIT’s Sloan School of Management in June of
1994. During his time at Sloan, he concentrated in Operations Management with a
particular emphasis on lean production and Total Quality Management. Rick served as
co-president of the Operations Management Club during 1992–93. He also participated
actively in the Sloan Outing Club and played for the school’s intramural ice hockey team.
In addition to Sloan’s regular management curriculum, Rick pursued additional
coursework at MIT’s Department of Electrical Engineering. Although he did not pursue a
formal degree, he did complete a large part of the undergraduate electrical engineering
core. His special interests include wave dynamics and semiconductor manufacturing.
Following graduation, Rick is planning to work for General Motors’ Saginaw Division as
a Senior Manufacturing Project Engineer. He will coordinate the cost and quality
improvement efforts at Plant 4 in Saginaw, Michigan.
Before coming to Sloan, Rick spent two years as a Financial Policy Analyst at Stern
Stewart & Company, a New York financial consulting firm. Stern Stewart advises senior
financial executives at industrial companies on corporate finance issues, including
mergers and acquisitions, financial restructuring, performance measurement, and
incentive compensation. While at Stern Stewart, Rick served as a research assistant for G.
Bennett Stewart, Senior Partner, in his writing of The Quest for Value (HarperCollins,
1991).
Rick graduated from Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, in June of 1988 with
a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics. Before college, he attended the Loomis Chaffee
School in Windsor, Connecticut.
6Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction................................................................................................7
Chapter 2 Lean Production.........................................................................................9
The Three Manufacturing Paradigms........................................................14
Lean Production Teams .............................................................................19
Chapter 3 Self-Directed Work Teams......................................................................26
Implementing Self-Directed Work Teams ..................................................29
Performance Measurement ........................................................................30
Cultural Dependence: A Common Myth....................................................32
Chapter 4 Texas Instruments Defense Systems & Electronics Group..................33
History of Teaming at TI............................................................................39
Switch Filter/Beam Former Team..............................................................42
Diamond Point Turning Team ...................................................................56
Incentive Structures....................................................................................71
Chapter 5 Conclusion.................................................................................................76
Key Success Factors...................................................................................76
Obstacles or Barriers.................................................................................78
Lessons Learned.........................................................................................82
References .................................................................................................84
7– 1 –
  Introduction
The members of the Diamond Point Turning Team (DPT) are seated around a
long table in a conference room at Texas Instrument’s Forest Lane facility. They are
having a slightly heated discussion. The issue centers around A/E, a measure of shop
floor performance that DPT follows carefully. A/E, or Actual/Earned hours, measures
shop floor productivity as the ratio of actual production time divided by the standard, or
“earned,” time for any given activity.
“How useful is A/E to our business?” asks one machine operator. “How does it
affect our business? Does anyone even care about A/E?”
“Hell, we don’t even know if the standards are right,” points out another operator.
“We need to make sure the standards are right.”
The first worker perks up a little bit. “Look, JIT1 has affected the standards. We
don’t run as many lots as before, and the set-up times are screwing up the standards.” He
stands up and starts pacing around the room. “It’s not fair to do a long set-up and then run
only eight parts -- the A/E spikes up to five- or six-hundred percent. Besides, the set-ups
take much longer than the standard. Look at this part -- the standard says 0.94 hours, but
the actual time is more like six hours!”
“I don’t think it’s reasonable for them to give us half an hour to set up that job.”
Someone on the other side of the table disagrees. “We know this is an indication
of how much it costs to make the part and we want to make it cost less.”
“OK, then let him spend the money to give us realistic standards. If we’re going
to look at it, we might as well look at accurate data -- if it’s not accurate, why look at it?”
* * *
                                                
1JIT stands for just-in-time.  See pages 11-12 for a definition of this manufacturing concept.
8This discussion is remarkable for two reasons. First, the team has raised a vitally
important issue that has implications for not only how DSEG runs its business, but also
how the company approaches the team concept itself. Second, the discussion betrays a
level of sophisticated thinking that one might expect from company managers (or second-
year business school students). Everyone in the room is participating, everyone speaks
the same language, and everyone demonstrates an excellent understanding of the issues
and tradeoffs in their full complexity. That the participants are actually shop floor
workers pays tribute to the success of TI DSEG’s efforts to empower its workers -- and
the workers’ ability to think for themselves.
The rest of this thesis presents a case study and analysis of two self-directed work
teams at TI DSEG. Chapter 2 outlines the major principles of lean production, and
describes the workings of lean production teams. Chapter 3 introduces the self-directed
work team concept, and highlights a major distinction between lean production teams and
self-directed teams. Chapter 4 outlines the history of teaming at Texas Instruments, and
then presents the case study on the Switch Filter/Beam Former Team and the Diamond
Point Turning Team. Finally, Chapter 5 identifies some of the key factors behind the
success of teams at TI DSEG -- and some of the obstacles that the teams have had to
overcome. Chapter 5 concludes with a few lessons and insights from the experience of TI
DSEG with self-directed work teams.
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   Lean Production
A revolution is sweeping manufacturing companies in the United States and
throughout the world. A new manufacturing system, called lean production, is rapidly
displacing Henry Ford’s old paradigm of mass production. In 1990, the International
Motor Vehicle Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology published the
authoritative work on lean production, entitled The Machine that Changed the World.2 In
clear and simple language, the authors outlined the major principles of lean production,
and described its origins at the Toyota Motor Company in the 1950s. Moreover, they
argued that lean production holds the key to improving manufacturing competitiveness in
the 1990s and beyond.
Lean production finds its origins in four well-known, but often-forgotten
principles: (1) The goal of a business enterprise is to create wealth for its owners by
creating value for its customers; (2) Resources are limited--they must never go to waste;
(3) Intensifying competition demands that all business enterprises continuously improve -
- by endlessly striving for ever higher quality, ever lower costs, and ever faster response
times; and (4) People are intelligent and motivated to do a good job -- give them the right
tools and adequate authority, and they will not only do their jobs well, but they will also
make improvements on their own initiative.
Create value for the customer
In Eliyahu Goldratt’s allegorical novel The Goal, physicist-turned-manufacturing
expert Jonah asks a simple question: “What is the goal of [a] manufacturing company?”3
                                                
2Womack, Jones, and Roos.
3Goldratt and Cox, p. 32.
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Alex Rogo, the plant manager and Jonah’s protégé, labors over this question for several
days, and finally comes to a startling conclusion: “The goal of a manufacturing
organization is to make money.”4 It sounds obvious, but what’s amazing is how often
business managers forget this simple goal. Moreover, few managers really understand
how to measure progress toward the goal, or how to link specific operating activities with
achieving the goal.
Wall Street analysts and financial accountants have dominated this discussion for
so long that it has become an unchallenged truth that making money is synonymous with
increasing reported quarterly earnings. The owners of a corporation, however, are the
shareholders, and shareholders do not take home the company’s earnings. The only way
for shareholders to make money is if the company pays dividends or if the price of the
company’s stock rises. Since dividends are really equivalent to forgone capital gains, the
argument arrives at an inescapable conclusion: For a corporation, “making money”
translates directly to creating wealth for the owners by increasing the company’s market
price. Reported earnings are, in fact, irrelevant.5
How, then, does a manufacturing company create wealth? The alarmingly simple
answer comes directly from the principles of Total Quality Management, one of the
cornerstones of lean production. A company creates wealth by creating value for its
customers. In other words, the source of new wealth is the value that companies offer
customers by delivering products that fulfill their needs. According to Shiba, Graham,
and Walden, “TQM companies focus on customers and on satisfying their needs.
Therefore, they must be able to react fast to changing customer needs and to focus their
limited resources on activities that satisfy customers.”6 If the goal is to create wealth for
the owners, then the means is to create value for the customers.
                                                
4Goldratt and Cox, p. 40.
5Stewart.
6Shiba, Graham, and Walden, p. 28.
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Relentlessly eliminate wasted resources
The second principle derives from another cornerstone of lean production, the
just-in-time management system (JIT). The central idea of JIT simply asserts that,
because resources are limited and costly, companies must never allow any resource to go
to waste. JIT imposes a new imperative on manufacturing managers and workers to
eliminate all forms of muda, or waste, with a vengeance. Moreover, the definition of
waste ties back to the concept of customer focus: JIT defines waste as anything that does
not add value for the customer. Examples of wasteful activities abound in the mass
production environment: inspecting products for defects, destroying excess and obsolete
inventory, scrapping or reworking defective parts, or moving parts and materials great
distances between sequential operations, to name just a few. None of these activities adds
any value for the customer -- all of them, therefore, waste resources by definition.
The principal means of reducing waste is quite simple: the JIT factory constantly
looks for ways to reduce lot sizes, where the ideal target is a lot size of one. As batch
sizes decrease, the production process becomes more and more fragile -- that is to say,
more and more vulnerable to a loss of control or an outright interruption. In other words,
reducing lot sizes necessarily reduces slack in the system. For such a fragile process to
work, the system cannot afford to waste any resource. As managers and workers
successfully reduce the reliance of the system on excess resource consumption, then and
only then can the process function with smaller batch sizes. Best of all, the company
receives a big pay-off: less waste and smaller batches yield lower operating expenses,
smaller inventory investments, shorter cycle times, faster response to changing market
conditions, and higher final product quality. Not bad.
Goldratt offers an interesting twist on the JIT concept with his Theory of
Constraints. Goldratt classifies all resources as either bottlenecks or non-bottlenecks. “A
bottleneck is any resource whose capacity is equal to or less than the demand placed upon
12
it. And a non-bottleneck is any resource whose capacity is greater than the demand
placed upon it.”7 This distinction, while fairly elementary, has some far-reaching
implications. First, since bottlenecks by definition constrain throughput, eliminating any
waste in these operations must take the highest priority. Specifically, managers and
workers must never allow bottlenecks to sit idle -- except for preventive maintenance.8
Likewise, bottlenecks must never process defective or unneeded parts. In addition,
improvement efforts should focus on reducing set-up times to increase each bottleneck’s
capacity. Second, maximizing the utilization rate of non-bottleneck resources does far
more harm than good. Allowing these operations to produce at a rate that exceeds the
capacity of the most tightly constrained resource does nothing to increase system
throughput; rather, the additional output simply piles up as work-in-process inventory,
which in turn absorbs scarce capital investment and imposes additional carrying costs.
Finally, because non-bottleneck resources operate below capacity, the plant can reduce
lot sizes for these operations without incurring any additional cost -- the extra set-ups
simply consume idle machine time. Furthermore, to the extent that workers can find ways
to reduce set-up times on non-bottleneck operations, they can reduce batch sizes even
further. And ultimately, smaller batches mean shorter throughput times and faster
response to changing customer needs.9
Continuously improve the process
TQM provides the third major principle at the heart of lean production: kaizen, or
continuous improvement. Recognizing that manufacturing in most industries has become
fiercely competitive, continuous improvement demands that managers and workers
constantly find ways to improve all aspects of business and manufacturing performance.
                                                
7Goldratt and Cox, pp. 137-138.
8In fact, it becomes exceedingly important to complete a regular schedule of preventive maintenance on
bottleneck operations to avoid a breakdown, which would leave the machine idle.
9This paragraph adapted from Goldratt and Cox, pp. 157-158, 206-208, 228-229.
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Workers apply standardized analytical methods to identify the root causes of problems
and devise solutions that ultimately improve manufacturing and business processes. In
addition to such reactive problem solving, workers also proactively seek out new and
better ways to satisfy the needs of their customers. Continuous improvement sets out a
moving target with which companies must try to keep pace. It is not enough to do as well
as you have always done -- you must continuously do better just to keep up with your
competition.
Empower workers to participate in the process
The final principle takes the form of a belief on the part of managers in the
capabilities of the shop floor workers. Under lean production, managers believe that
production workers possess enough intelligence, education, skills, innovation, and self-
motivation not only to perform their jobs well, but to do so without much supervision.
Furthermore, workers are capable of discovering ways of improving productivity, quality,
and profits on their own initiative. This faith in the abilities of factory workers contrasts
sharply with the conventional wisdom under the mass production system:
“The problem with the American pattern is that it is extremely corrosive to
the vital personal relationships at the core of any production process.
Mass-production workers are under no illusions that their employer is
going to stand at their side through thick and thin. Indeed, the most
important function of mass-production unions is to bargain for seniority
rights and for layoff compensation for those chucked over the side of the
company ship. . . .the consequence is a distinct lack of commitment on the
part of workers. . . .”10
Lean production, therefore, finds two virtues in empowering the shop floor workers: (1)
empowerment leverages the talents and experiences of the workers in managing and
improving the manufacturing process, and (2) it imparts a sense of identification and
                                                
10Womack, Jones, and Roos, p. 248.
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involvement to the workers that translates into a strong commitment to excellence in
performing all of their tasks.
The Three Manufacturing Paradigms11
These ideas about empowerment and participation define a major difference
between lean production, and each of the two previous manufacturing paradigms -- the
Ford/Taylor mass production system, and the original craft production system. As Exhibit
1 illustrates, the difference centers on the classic trade-off between depth of expertise and
breadth of functional capabilities. Under the craft system of the eighteenth- and
nineteenth centuries, individual workers -- carpenters, metal smiths, fabric makers,
bakers, and so on -- mastered the complete set of skills in their respective trades (see the
top panel of Exhibit 1). Each artisan achieved, through lifetime training and practice, an
extreme depth of expertise in a single industrial activity. Although the craft system
produced goods of exceptionally fine quality, it suffered from certain inherent limitations:
small production volumes, a low degree of standardization, and very high manufacturing
costs.
Henry Ford and Frederick Taylor, among others, developed several innovations in
the early twentieth century to address the limitations of the craft system. The Ford/Taylor
mass production system took Adam Smith’s division of labor to its logical extreme. The
middle panel of Exhibit 1 illustrates how Taylor’s scientific management concept broke
down the manufacturing process into minute production tasks small enough for one
worker, with minimal skills, to perform repetitively. This idea worked quite well with
Ford’s new moving assembly line and highly standardized parts. Mass production divided
the factory into separate functional silos -- fabrication, assembly, inspection, purchasing,
                                                
11This section adapted from Klein, pp. 9-12;  and Womack, Jones, and Roos, pp. 21-51.
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shipping, and industrial engineering. The factory assigned workers within each function
to perform a particular task over and over again, hundreds of times each day. Industrial
engineers studied the tasks in great detail, and spelled out precise work standards. And
first-line supervisors watched over the shop floor workers carefully, to make sure they
didn’t slack off. For more than four decades -- roughly 1920 through 1965 -- mass
production served the needs of the rapidly growing, consumer-oriented US economy
exceptionally well.
Enter Toyota and the Lean Production System.
Lean Production
Rising from the ashes of World War II, the Toyota Motor Company devised an
entirely new approach to manufacturing. During the 1950s, Taiichi Ohno, Toyota’s
brilliant production chief, developed and later perfected the Toyota Production System.
Ohno literally invented the concept of JIT, and pursued Total Quality with a vengeance.
As the Big Three automakers soon discovered, much to their dismay, Ohno’s new
production system had become a potent competitive weapon. Toyota exploited its
advantage masterfully as the company began to invade foreign markets in the late-1970s
and through the 1980s. Superb product quality and customer service, combined with low
costs and lightening fast response to rapidly changing markets earned Toyota a strong
and improving position in North America and Europe.
The Toyota Production System soon became the model for a third manufacturing
paradigm, what we now call lean production. As other manufacturing companies have
gradually awakened to the new competitive reality, they have begun to emulate Toyota’s
lean production techniques. As a result, lean production is already rapidly displacing
mass production at manufacturing companies in the US and throughout the world.
16
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Exhibit 1
The Three Manufacturing Paradigms
Skill Sets of Individual Workers
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Worker participation and empowerment, as we have already discussed, provide a
large part of the foundation for lean production. In fact, Krafcik, one of the original
IMVP researchers, includes the idea of empowered work teams in his definition of lean
production:
Lean production is a system “taking the minds + hands philosophy of the
craftsmen era, merging it with the work standardization and assembly line
of the Fordist system, and adding the glue of teamwork for good measure.
Management did not think of workers as replaceable cogs in a great
production machine; each worker was trained for a variety of jobs and
skills -- not just production tasks but maintenance, record keeping, quality
control, and more. Rather than delegating the task of work standardization
to a stopwatch-toting industrial engineer, management trained the
shopfloor workers themselves in that task and gave them the responsibility
to continuously improve performance. Scientific management techniques
were not thrown away; they were just performed by different, more
appropriate employees. Finally, management organized workers into
teams -- teams that were largely autonomous, did not require large white-
collar staffs, and were more capable of reacting to shifts in production
content than were the rigidly standardized Fordist laborers and
supervisors.”12 (emphasis added)
The bottom panel of Exhibit 1 illustrates Krafcik’s point. Lean producers assemble
workers into small teams with a defined set of production-related responsibilities. Each member
of the team cross-trains in all of the activities within the team’s boundaries. As a result, each
worker achieves a moderate level of expertise in a wide variety of functional tasks. Teams may
periodically rotate assignments among their members, and workers participate actively in process
and quality improvement activities. Supervision, while lighter than mass production, does not
disappear entirely. Team leaders coordinate the activities of each team, and group leaders
facilitate interactions between related teams. Moreover, lean production uses scientific
management techniques even more fervently than mass production -- only instead of industrial
engineers, it is the workers themselves who devise the standardized procedures and measure the
standard production times.13
                                                
12Krafcik, p. 43.
13Klein, pp. 10-11; and Adler.
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Lean Production Teams
At the heart of the lean production team concept lies a chain of six inter-
connected management practices: (1) teamwork, (2) participation, (3) flexibility, (4)
empowerment, (5) the just-in-time system, and (6) cooperative labor relations. Exhibit 2
presents this concept of a cross-linked chain of management practices.
Teamwork
Lean producers organize their entire workforce into several hundred work teams.
Each team encompasses anywhere from five to fifteen members or so, and sometimes a
team leader, a team facilitator, or rotating leadership. Leaders come from the ranks of the
shop floor workers, not plant management. Each member of a particular team learns all of
the jobs within that team’s responsibility, and team members rotate jobs periodically
among themselves. Team responsibilities often cross functional boundaries, and include
many tasks that in typical factories would fall within the exclusive purview of
management or engineering.
Participation
In a typical mass production environment, managers assign a single production
task to each worker, who repeats that same activity hundreds of times each day. These
factories also employ armies of salaried support workers and industrial engineers to help
keep the production line running smoothly and without interruption. The Lean Production
System, in contrast, handles things much differently. In addition to their regularly
assigned production tasks, shop floor workers perform a host of production support tasks.
These additional assignments include scheduling shifts, assuring quality, maintaining and
repairing equipment, redesigning and improving processes, measuring performance, and
ordering supplies.
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This approach offers two major advantages: First, the variety of assignments helps
to motivate the workers, prevents boredom, and improves morale. Second, it allows
managers to tap the wealth of experience and knowledge of the manufacturing process
that only shop floor workers possess. This concept of worker participation embraces two
important Japanese principles: kaizen, and jidoka:
• Kaizen, or continuous improvement, implores managers and workers to pursue
relentlessly ways of improving business and manufacturing processes through
better quality, higher productivity, lower cost, safer work methods, and less
waste. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of mass production, improving
quality almost always automatically improves all of these other dimensions
simultaneously.
• Jidoka, the quality principle, maintains that the only way to guarantee the
quality of the final product is by guaranteeing the quality of the production
process itself. The quality of a product is only as good as the quality of the
process that manufactured it.
The need for workers to participate actively in managing and improving the
production process raises a thorny issue. Workers know that if they take the initiative to
make process improvements that increase efficiency, the company might find that it can
get by with fewer workers. The only way that workers will help to improve efficiency is
if they know that management won’t “reward” their efforts by eliminating jobs. Some
companies -- NUMMI, for example -- have addressed this problem by offering
guaranteed job security in exchange for active worker participation.
21
Exhibit 2
Lean Production Teams:
Management Practices
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Another important difference between lean production and mass production
relates to the flexibility of the workforce. In a typical mass production environment, the
Taylorist production system enforces a rigid system of hundreds of job classifications for
unskilled hourly workers, and dozens of classifications for skilled tradesmen. The Taylor
approach imposes strict rules defining a narrow set of allowable tasks for each
classification, and violations on the part of management invariably leads to a grievance,
or worse.
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The Lean Production System scraps this complex web of tangled classifications
and work rules in favor of a highly simplified and flexible system: one classification for
all unskilled production workers, and just a handful for skilled trades. Instead of rigidly
assigning each worker to a narrow and fixed task, lean producers have a flexible force of
multi-skilled workers that move fluidly from one task to another, as needed. Lean
producers provide extensive training of their workers in a variety of job-related skills, and
workers often use their own judgment in deciding when and how to apply those skills on
the assembly line.
Empowerment
The process of empowering the workforce involves two steps: first, the company
breaks down barriers between management and workers by eliminating manager’s special
privileges, and second, the company literally empowers the workforce by transferring
decision-making authority from the exclusive control of managers down to the shop floor
workers themselves.
Management perquisites at most American factories have always irritated hourly
workers. Workers resent feeling like second-class citizens as they watch supervisors and
senior plant managers take advantage of reserved parking spaces, posh executive dining
rooms, and comfortable, private offices. Not so under lean production. Lean factories
offer none of these special privileges for managers, and the system tries to put everyone -
- from the plant manager to the shop floor worker -- on an equal plane. In some
companies, managers and workers even wear identical uniforms.
Workers also resent management by fiat -- arbitrary command decisions handed
down from the all-powerful foreman. Again, the Lean Production System has turned the
old mass production logic on its head. Lean factories have no swarm of white-coated
industrial engineers watching over the work flow and telling workers how to do their
jobs. Rather, the workers themselves, who are intimately familiar with the tasks they
23
perform each day, design their own process flows, discover their own process
improvements, measure their own standards, and evaluate their own performance.
Moreover, empowerment is more than just an abstraction; it really happens. At NUMMI,
for example:
• The company initiated an employee suggestion program in March of
1986. Not only do employees participate actively -- they generated over
10,000 suggestions in 1991 alone -- but NUMMI’s managers actually
listen. The company implemented over 80 percent of employee
suggestions.14
• NUMMI granted work teams the authority to purchase their own
supplies, and backed them up by providing each team with its own
account.15
• The plant allows and even encourages individual workers to stop the
assembly line whenever problems arise -- not just for safety reasons, but
also to prevent installing defective parts or making errors in assembly.
The contract guarantees workers against discipline for stopping the line
as needed.16
The success of this approach to empowerment depends critically on changing the
entire purpose and outlook of the middle-management hierarchy at all of the company’s
plants. Overall, the management structure is somewhat flatter than the typical mass
production plant. More important, however, is the role that middle managers and
engineers play at a lean producer. Their job is not to command workers to work harder, or
to watch over their every move, but rather to coach workers, to support them, to motivate
them, and to teach them whenever they need assistance. The first-line supervisor, in
particular, becomes less of a master, and more of a team leader or facilitator. Managers
and engineers provide assistance and expertise, almost like internal consultants, to the
lean production teams, but only when the teams cannot work things out by themselves.
                                                
14
“New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.”;  and Adler.
15Adler.
16New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.”;   and Adler.
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Just-in-Time
Managers at US factories have long misunderstood the Japanese notion of just-in-
time management (JIT). To most American executives, the central principle of JIT is to
minimize factory inventories at all costs, particularly by coercing suppliers into holding
onto inventory longer and delivering parts and materials more frequently. The supposed
benefit of this practice is twofold: (1) it reduces inventory carrying costs, and (2) it
exposes problems and weaknesses in the manufacturing process by eliminating the
protection of large inventory stocks.
The reality is that the Americans have it all backwards. The Japanese understand
that JIT doesn’t begin with inventory reduction (although it does end up there). Rather,
the central idea is to eliminate muda, or waste, in all forms. By persistently attacking and
destroying all sources of waste, and by breaking any constraints or bottlenecks, workers
actually enable the factory to get by with much lower levels of inventory. The true
benefit of JIT, however, comes from the higher quality and lower costs that result from
eliminating wasted resources, and from the much faster response time to changing market
conditions. Thus, the American view of JIT reverses cause and effect.
Lean production, having grown out of Toyota’s revolution in production
management, embraces the Japanese approach to JIT. Production teams actively seek out
new ways to improve the process and reduce wasted material and effort. Each production
station takes responsibility to assure that its work meets the quality standards of the next
station in line. Special teams devoted to kaizen activities also work with production teams
to discover additional process improvements. As a result of this never-ending quest for
improvement, lean production factories do in fact operate with significantly less work-in-
process inventory than the typical mass production plant. Lean producers also devote
much less space to reworking and repairing defective products, because the system
simply does not allow quality problems to persist.
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Cooperation
Lean production makes a conscious commitment to promoting an atmosphere of
cooperation and reconciliation between managers and workers. That commitment begins
with the labor contract itself. As discussed above, one key provision in many such labor
agreements is a guarantee that the company will not lay off workers except in dire
circumstances. Actions, of course, speak louder than words, and NUMMI, for one, has
proven that it means what it says. In 1988, when sales of the Chevy Nova dropped
substantially and NUMMI’s Fremont plant was running at only 60 percent of capacity,
the company did not lay off a single worker. Rather, the factory re-deployed workers
from the assembly line into additional process improvement teams. NUMMI also sent
some to extra training programs.17 The willingness of NUMMI to live up to its word
earned the company the respect and trust of the workers.
Managers at lean producers also consult with the leadership of the local union on
a regular basis on matters of mutual concern. The union can play an active role in
assisting management evaluate and select new workers from incoming applications. The
end result is that the union and its members feel that the company really cares about
creating a positive working relationship and a cooperative atmosphere in the plant. They
believe that management deserves their cooperation and their best efforts.
                                                
17Adler.
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   Self-Directed Work Teams
Self-directed work teams are quite similar to lean production teams. In fact, many
students of shop floor organization have failed to make a distinction between the two.
Exhibit 3 clarifies the difference between lean production teams and self-directed work
teams by highlighting the similarities and differences. Although separate and distinct
concepts, the two have many principles in common, notably teamwork, empowerment,
participation, flexibility, and cooperation. There are two important distinctions, however.
First, participation for lean production teams focuses heavily on continuously improving
the process (TQM) and relentlessly eliminating waste (JIT). For self-directed work teams,
in contrast, participation focuses on allowing shop floor workers to take on administrative
and managerial tasks, in addition to regular production activities.
Second, lean producers expect team members to cross-train in all of the skills
within the team’s boundaries (refer back to the bottom panel of Exhibit 1, page 16). As a
result, team members cannot ever achieve more than a moderate level of expertise in any
one activity, and the team may end up with excessive redundancy. Self-directed teams, on
the other hand, recognize that human limitations place a cap on the number of different
competencies that any one individual can master. Self-directed teams do not expect every
team member to learn every skill within the team’s boundaries. Rather, the team
leverages the diverse and complementary skills of all of its members to ensure that the
team-as-a-whole has all of the needed competencies with just enough redundancy.18
Exhibit 4 summarizes the differences between self-directed work teams, lean
production teams, and shop floor organization under the two earlier manufacturing
paradigms. Notice that of the four systems, only self-directed work teams expand into the
                                                
18Klein, p. 12.
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third dimension, “Administrative & Managerial Activities.” Furthermore, the cube
representing self-directed teams covers the skill set of the team-as-a-whole, whereas the
regions representing the other three systems cover the skill set of any individual worker.
Lean production and self-directed work teams developed historically at different
times and in different parts of the world. Nevertheless, given that the two concepts share
so much common ground, many lean producers have begun to expand the boundaries of
their work teams to encompass not only kaizen activities, but also administrative and
managerial tasks; as a result, they have created truly self-directed work teams under the
lean production banner. For the remainder of this paper, we will refer exclusively to self-
directed work teams that fit this expanded definition.
Exhibit 3
A Crucial Distinction
Lean Production Teams versus Self-Directed Work Teams
Teamwork
Empowerment
Participation
Flexibility
Cooperation
Just-in-Time
Continuous
Improvement
Administrative
Tasks
Team-Based
Skills
Lean Production Self-Directed Work Teams
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Exhibit 4
Self-Directed Work Teams
Skill Set of the Team-as-a-Whole
Lean
Self-Directed Work Teams
Craft Functional Tasks
Administrative
& Managerial
ACtivities
Mass
Source: Klein.
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Implementing Self-directed Work Teams
Creating self-directed work teams is an evolutionary process consisting of four
major steps: (1) cross-training, (2) enhancing teamwork skills, (3) participating in
proactive improvement efforts, and (4) developing administrative skills.
• Cross-training: Workers must learn how to do many but not necessarily all of the
production tasks within the mission of their team. Cross-training not only allows team
members to substitute for absentee workers on a moment’s notice, but it also enables
the team to realize job rotation. Rotation has the advantage of adding variety to workers
jobs and thus relieving boredom.
• Teamwork: Workers must enhance their ability to work with others, by learning or
improving such skills as cooperation, conflict resolution, communication, negotiation,
and consensus formation.
• Proactive Improvement: Management must empower workers to begin diagnosing and
analyzing production processes, and to develop and implement ideas for improving
quality, increasing productivity, and reducing waste.
• Developing Administrative Skills: Team members need to develop production support
and administrative skills, including maintenance and repair, quality control, scheduling,
purchasing, inventory control, personnel management, performance measurement, and
personal computer skills.
In addition, a smooth transition depends heavily on securing management
commitment, preferably early in the process. Senior managers can provide the vision and
leadership needed to spark change throughout the organization. Equally important, the
buy-in of middle managers can help overcome their natural fear of organizational change,
and prevent any counter-productive resistance from developing.
Managers and team members alike must remember that this process takes a great
deal of time, and teams may experience setbacks en route to full self-direction. Teams
that attempt to take on too much responsibility too quickly are destined to fail miserably.
Moreover, when things don’t work out well for a specific initiative, as is bound to happen
occasionally, it is important to pick up the pieces, learn from the mistakes, and move on.
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Assigning blame is a counter-productive effort in futility, and managers and workers
must overcome this temptation, which is so common under the mass production system.
Performance Measurement
The performance measurement system in a manufacturing company should serve
three important objectives. First, it provides information that links specific operating
actions and decisions to the goal of the company -- to increase shareholder value. Second,
it provides a way of identifying specific problems that the company may need to address,
and a way of tracking the progress and success of continuous improvement activities.
Finally, the choice of performance metrics sends a message to the shop floor that
indicates the particular dimensions of performance that the company considers important
for its success.
Performance measurement systems under the traditional mass production regime
generally served these objectives rather poorly (although they did serve the objectives of
mass production quite well). Managers at mass production firms typically placed great
emphasis on metrics such as labor and equipment utilization rates, fully-absorbed
manufacturing cost and its variance against the standard, and actual versus standard
production hours. Unfortunately, these types of metrics encouraged managers and
workers to maximize output and minimize cost without regard to other vital parameters
such as process quality, lot sizes, defect rates, inventory levels, or customer satisfaction.
Furthermore, managers would often use performance results as an opportunity to assign
blame for what went wrong rather than to find opportunities for improvement.
Once a company adopts lean production and empowered work teams, managers
may find that the company’s performance measurement system undermines the
objectives of these new initiatives. Developing a comprehensive and standardized system
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of performance measurement across teams would solve this problem. One approach
might follow the example of Analog Devices Incorporated (ADI), which pioneered the
“performance scorecard” as part of the company’s TQM efforts during the 1980s.19 The
scorecard presented on a single page a handful of key metrics that together painted a
comprehensive picture of ADI’s performance along several dimensions. The company
followed a few important principles in designing the scorecard system:
• Taking an idea from TQM, the scorecards “focus on the vital few.” Rather than
presenting a laundry list of every imaginable performance metric, the scorecards
present only the few measurements that have the biggest bottom-line impact.
• The list is nevertheless comprehensive and balanced. It includes both financial
and non-financial metrics, internal manufacturing and external customer
satisfaction metrics, current production and product development metrics.
• The financial measures focus not on reducing costs, but rather on increasing
revenues and profits, for two reasons. First, the goal of the company, as we have
said, is to make money, not to minimize costs.20 Second, the opportunities to
increase revenues are almost always far greater than the possibilities to reduce
costs.
• The scorecard presents each item as it evolves over several periods, either
monthly or quarterly. The page also compares actual performance against
targets or benchmarks.
• The clear purpose of the scorecards is to stimulate improvement, not to assess
blame. The report highlights problems and weaknesses that the company needs
to address, and it tracks the progress of continuous improvement over time and
against fixed benchmarks.
 The exact details do not make much difference. What does matter, however, is that the
company aligns its performance measurement system with the goals of lean production
and the team concept.
                                                
19Kaplan., pp. 6 & 21.
20A decision that reduces costs does not always increase profits.  Likewise, a decision that increases profits
may sometimes also increase costs.
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Cultural Dependence: A Common Myth
Lean production, like any revolution in thinking, has its detractors in both
industry and the university. Many critics often argue that, although lean production
clearly works exceedingly well in Japan, where it originated, it is doomed to fail in the
United States because of the vast cultural differences between the two countries.
Especially in the vital areas of cooperation and consensus, many argue, the lean
production practices hinge critically on the culture and traditions of Japanese society.
Such a system has no chance of taking root in the individualistic and anti-authoritarian
society of the US.
This line of thinking really misses the whole point. Of course some of these practices
have their foundation in Japanese culture and traditions. But that does not exclude the possibility
that they can succeed in the West. Innovative managers can learn lessons from the exceptional
performance of Japanese manufacturing companies, and invent ways of shaping and adapting
these practices to fit Western culture and traditions. Moreover, real-world experience clearly
refutes the notion that culture alone determines success or failure in adopting lean production.
Toyota’s Georgetown and Lexington, Kentucky, assembly plants; Honda’s Marysville, Ohio,
factory; NUMMI, the GM-Toyota joint venture in Fremont, California; and GM’s Saturn
operation in Spring Hill, Tennessee -- all of these facilities have successfully applied lean
production methods on American soil with American labor, in some cases with American
unionized labor. In addition, Krafcik’s survey of dozens of auto-assembly plants demonstrates
that plant performance -- both quality and productivity -- depends not on country of location, but
rather on the type of production system employed.21 The Machine that Changed the World
summarizes the argument quite well: “the fundamental ideas of lean production are universal --
applicable anywhere by anyone. . . .”22
                                                
21Krafcik, pp. 41-42.
22Womack, Jones, and Roos, p. 9.
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Texas Instruments
    Defense Systems & Electronics Group
Texas Instruments Defense Systems & Electronics Group stands alone. No other
defense contractor has ever won the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award. TI
DSEG, along with four other companies, won the prestigious prize in 1992. At the
awards ceremony in December of that year, then-President George Bush commented,
“This TI subsidiary has grown to become the nation’s eighth largest defense electronics
contractor. And we know from the success of Desert Storm that in matters of advanced
weaponry, quality is absolutely essential. . . .we know too from the success of Desert
Storm that TI’s contributions to this effort were absolutely invaluable.”23 TI DSEG
manufactured many of the weapons systems, including the HARM missile and the
Paveway guidance system, that the US Navy and Air Force deployed against Iraqi targets
during Operation Desert Storm, the Pentagon’s code name for its campaign in the Persian
Gulf War.
Despite winning the Baldridge Award in 1992, the business outlook for DSEG
was not all that bright. When the people of East Germany toppled the hated Berlin Wall
in 1989, the world celebrated the end of the Cold War and the triumph of freedom over
oppression. Although these events offered great hope for peace and prosperity, they also
brought with them a certain amount of pain for the US defense industry. With the
reduction in tensions between the superpowers, the US military could at last begin to
downsize from its huge build-up during the 1980s. These force reductions, coupled with a
deep recession during 1990 and 1991, had a devastating impact on many defense
contractors. Although the downturn did impact the performance of TI DSEG, the
                                                
23Reuters, December 14, 1992.
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company remained profitable throughout the period and ultimately emerged with a strong
position in the defense market. Exhibit 6 shows financial results for TI’s Defense
Electronics Systems Sector, which includes DSEG.
The Defense System Sector’s turnover ratio (sales/beginning assets) dropped from
2.06x in 1988 to 1.73x in 1991. Simultaneously, the sector’s profit margin (operating
profit/sales) plunged from above 10 percent to below 6 percent. As a result, return on
assets -- the product of turnover and profit margin -- collapsed, dropping from nearly 21
percent in 1988 to below 10 percent in 1991. These fluctuations, to be fair, may
exaggerate the true situation -- the sales figures are highly sensitive to the timing of
specific individual contracts, which often involve large sums of money.
As we will discuss in the next section, it was around this time that senior
managers at DSEG began to consider making some major changes in the structure and
operation of the division. The crisis that defense cutbacks and recession had precipitated
may have given DSEG’s managers all the motivation they needed to seek organizational
change.
DSEG staged a remarkable comeback in 1992: the turnover ratio bounced back to
2.1x, profit margin reached nearly 10 percent, and return on assets recovered to better
than 20 percent. Moreover, the results for 1993 continued to show improvement.
Although many factors may have contributed to the turnaround, including the end of the
recession, there is little doubt that organizational change played a significant role. Self-
directed work teams have reduced manufacturing costs, slashed cycle times, increased
product quality, and improved on-time delivery.
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Exhibit 5
TI DSEG at a glance
1993 Revenues $1.86 billion.
Share of TI’s Revenue 22 percent.
Employees 14,000.
Products Precision-guided weapons
Radar systems
Navigation systems
Infrared surveillance systems
Fire control systems
Electronic warfare systems
Headquarters Dallas, Texas.
Locations 11 facilities in north and central Texas.
Activities Research, design, and development;
Manufacturing, testing, and distribution.
Customers US Department of Defense
Foreign governments allied with the US -- 10% of sales
Officers Dean Clubb, President
Source: Business America; Texas Instruments Annual Report to Shareholders (1993);
Texas Instruments Defense Systems and Electronics Group.
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Exhibit 6
Texas Instruments
Defense Systems and Electronics Group
Summary of Operating Performance
Turnover
(Sales/Beginning Assets)
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Profit Margin
(Operating Profit/Sales)
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
11%
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Continues --->
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Exhibit 6 -- Continued
Return on Assets
(Operating Profit/Beginning Assets)
Return on Assets = Turnover x Profit Margin
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
22%
24%
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Source: Texas Instruments Annual Report to Shareholders (1988 - 1993).
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History of Teaming at TI
Throughout much of its history, TI has taken a team approach in many situations.
Originally, the company created teams around a specific project or program, and
structured the teams in a conventional fashion, as functional blocks that fit nicely into the
standard organizational hierarchy. The teams, perhaps emulating a military ethic,
operated under a rigid command and control philosophy. Separated into neatly arranged
functional silos, these teams were not especially effective and tended to arrive at sub-
optimal solutions.
Some time later, TI began dabbling in problem-solving teams. A big problem or
hot issue would surface, and the company would assemble a team of experts from
management or engineering. The team would then set out to analyze the problem and
develop solutions for the people who did the day-to-day work. These teams often
succeeded in correcting the problem in the short term, only to have the same problem
return six months later, after the team had either moved on to the next problem or
disbanded. This type of team often eliminated only short term symptoms rather than the
true long term root causes.
Effectiveness Teams
In the early 1980s, the Japanese concept of the quality circle became quite popular
in the United States. TI introduced its own version, called Effectiveness Teams, or ETs.
For the first time, the company included shop floor workers as team members, and
provided them with training in teamwork and problem-solving skills. Management,
however, did not allow the ETs to consider business problems; rather, they would focus
only on solving narrowly defined production issues. The program kept participation on a
voluntary basis. That decision sent a signal that ETs were not all that important to the
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company, and it polarized people into two camps. Nevertheless, shop floor workers did
become involved in solving problems, running meetings, and working with other people.
As a result, ETs succeeded in addressing certain production problems. Moreover, the
program created a foundation for understanding the team process among managers and
workers alike.
A few years later, US companies began experimenting with JIT and SQC.
Factories began shifting away from batch production and toward continuous flow
production. Managers noticed that JIT required production workers to start becoming
involved in higher-level decisions, and it required people to take ownership of the
process. The more people participated, the more they could improve the processes. The
shop floor workers understood how things worked on the line far better than the
supervisors and manufacturing/industrial engineers. Once they understood the objectives
of JIT, they figured out how to make it work in practice.
Self-directed work teams
In 1987, middle managers at a few business units -- including DSEG -- began
looking at the self-managing concept. They brought in some outside experts to teach
them more about this idea, and established a few pilot teams at the grass-roots level.
Unlike the earlier experiment with ETs, the new self-directed teams focused not only on
production problems, but also on broader business issues and customer needs. Senior
managers began to take notice of the positive impact that worker participation was having
on productivity. Self-directed work teams had taken root and were beginning to spread.
In 1991, DSEG formed a new staff group called High Performing Organizations
Development. HPOD’s charter was to take the successful concepts and practices from the
depths of the division and disseminate them to the organization-at-large. HPOD would
help DSEG move toward team-based empowerment and participation. The group would
also begin aligning the company’s systems to the team concept.
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One of HPOD’s initial tasks was to create a database of all teams within DSEG.
The database would simplify the team registration process, help teams communicate, and
allow teams to share success stories. Currently, the database includes more than 1,100
teams. The following table categorizes the teams by general business function:
Number
Business Function of Teams
Product Production Process 395
Customer Support, Material Service Suppliers 264
Product Development 184
Technology 72
Miscellaneous    185   
Total    1,100   
The next two sections present a case study of two specific teams at TI DSEG. The
Switch Filter/Beam Former Team assembles microwave circuit boards for the HARM
missile program; the Diamond Point Turning Team manufactures precision optical
components for military and industrial applications. Both teams have achieved a high
level of maturity and enjoyed great success as self-directed work teams.
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Exhibit 7
HARM -- High-Speed Anti-Radar Missile
Control
Guidance
Warhead
Rocket Motor  
Switch Filter/Beam Former Team
The Switch Filter/Beam Former Team is one of seven work teams that together
comprise the Microwave Circuit Board Shop at Texas Instruments’ Lewisville facility.
Located about 15 miles north of Dallas on a lonely stretch of Highway 121, the
sprawling, two-story Lewisville complex manufactures advanced guidance, detection,
and weapon systems for the US Air Force and US Navy. The Microwave Circuit Board
Shop, or MCB, produces components for the guidance system of the highly successful
HARM missile program.
HARM, or High-Speed Anti-Radar Missile, gives tactical aircraft the ability to
destroy ground- and sea-based defensive radar systems, rendering enemy installations
unprotected from air attack. A sophisticated electronic guidance system detects the
enemy’s outgoing radar signal, and exploits these radio waves to maneuver the missile
directly to its intended target. Exhibit 7 presents a schematic diagram of the fully
assembled HARM missile.
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The HARM guidance system is a complicated sub-assembly that consists of
several inter-connected microwave circuit boards and a broadband radio frequency
antenna and receiver. The MCB shop assembles ten different circuit boards that together
make a complete HARM guidance system. Organized as seven self-directed work teams,
MCB has piloted many new initiatives as the team concept has evolved at TI DSEG. As a
result, the MCB work teams are among the most mature within the division.
Except for the Prep Cell team, each of the seven work teams manufactures one or
two of the ten circuit boards for the HARM’s guidance system. The Prep Cell team
assembles kits of parts for each circuit board, and distributes the kits to the production
teams. The Switch Filter/Beam Former Team, as its name suggests, assembles two of the
ten microwave circuit boards. The team has twelve members.
Production Process
The members of the SF/BF team work together as an integrated work cell to
assemble the two circuit boards front-to-back. The team members occupy individual
workstations that are all located contiguously in a single area of the MCB shop. Target
production for the HARM missile is currently nine units per day. Each unit requires one
switch filter and one beam former. MCB uses the line of balance, or LOB, method to
keep track of parts production. The LOB for any given part measures the cumulative
difference between planned and actual production volume. For example, suppose the
LOB for switch filters starts out one morning at +2. If target production is 9 units, and the
team produces only 6, then the LOB falls to –1 by the end of the day.24
                                                
24The calculation proceeds as follows:
Ending LOB = Starting LOB + Actual Volume – Target Volume
= +2 + 6 – 9
= –1
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After the part kits arrive each morning from the Prep Cell Team, the team follows
a process flow (see Exhibit 8) that involves about seven distinct operations, some in
series and some in parallel:
• Flow Line: Manually place and solder integrated circuits and discrete devices
onto the switch filter or beam former circuit boards.
• Potting: Fill in gaps between components with a putty-like substance to isolate
each electronic device from the others.
• Metal Foil and Auto Weld: Place metal foil over each integrated circuit and
manually weld the four corners of each piece in place. Deliver the boards to the
Auto Weld area. Complete the welding on each board using CNC equipment.
• RF Washers: Place and attach metal washers at certain positions on the boards.
• Assemble Flex, Tray, and Cover: Enclose board and flexible interface cables
within tray and cover assembly.
• Wire Flex: Connect flexible external ports to circuit board.
• Additional Potting: Cover key components with potting to shield them from
electromagnetic interference.
A central computer system tracks all of the production-related paperwork. A
production data sheet, including appropriate bar coding for easy data-input, travels with
each circuit board through the process. All of the workers have a terminal at their
workstation, and they retrieve their own reports right on-line. In particular, team
members can see the current production status of every team in the MCB Shop -- and
every team’s Line of Balance. Other on-line data includes inventory, quality, defects, and
actual/earned hours.
Team members work eight-and-a-half hours each day, including a half-hour lunch
break and two ten-minute coffee breaks. MCB has adopted a flextime policy: workers
generally start at 6:30 am and leave at 3 pm, but they are free to start as late as 8:30 am
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(and stay until 5). If workers need to miss work and have a legitimate excuse, they can
call in by 8 am and ask other workers to cover their tasks.
This process differs significantly from the system that reigned before TI DSEG
adopted self-directed work teams. Each worker simply completed a handful of assigned
production tasks on each board as it went by on a continuous flow line. The same
assembly line produced all ten of the microwave circuit boards for the HARM missile.
Although each worker performed the same task repetitively, they worked on many
different types of boards. TI had to keep some additional workers, called ‘floaters,’ on the
payroll. These workers knew how to do every job on the line, and could fill in for any
absentee workers.
One worker, looking back and comparing the old system with the current team
concept, said, “I miss the variety of boards, but everyone gets to know what they’re doing
real well.”
Before self-directed work teams, the supervisor stood watch over the line, and
workers were not supposed to even talk to each other on the line. As one team member
put it, “You had someone down the other end of the line cracking the whip.” And the
supervisors weren’t always even-handed: “That’s the problem with supervisors, you
always get favoritism.”
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Incentive Compensation
All of the workers in the MCB area are participating in a pilot program for Pride
& Share, a new initiative that provides both pay-for-knowledge and pay-for-performance
components. The performance awards relate to the performance of MCB-as-a-whole,
rather than individual teams. As part of Pride & Share, MCB is also working on Job Class
Consolidation. MCB is trying to move toward just three job classifications (for more
information on Job Class Consolidation and Pride & Share, see pages 70-73).
Administrative Tasks
Each worker has responsibility for one or two production tasks, plus several
administrative and support tasks, called starpoints (see Exhibit 9). Each starpoint carries
with it certain daily and weekly responsibilities. More important, workers keep each other
up-to-date on any issues or problems that arise related to their individual starpoints.
Starpoint tasks include staffing, safety, line of balance graphs, tooling, methods
improvement, mail, and checks. DSEG makes training classes available to provide
workers the skills they need to handle starpoint tasks. Moreover, the team cannot assume
all of the supervisory responsibilities all at once. Gradually, over a period of time, the
team takes on greater and greater responsibility. Team members rotate periodically
through different starpoints to learn new skills and to avoid getting stuck with unpopular
tasks.
The MCB team coordinator estimates that administrative tasks take an average
one-and-a-half hours each day, and meetings an additional half-hour; that leaves six
hours-a-day for production work. In addition to starpoints, the MCB has created four
resource teams: Cost Resource Team, Six Sigma Team, Cycle Time Team, and People
Involvement Team.
48
Exhibit 9
Switch Filter/Beam Former Team
Task Assignments
Team Years
Member at TI Production Tasks Starpoint Tasks
1 7 Flow Line -- switch filter Team Representative
PB Autoload
Parts
2 11 Flow Line -- switch filter Mail
Checks
Teaming for Excellence
Tooling Back-up
3 6 Flow Line -- switch filter (none)
(Trainee)
4 4 12 Flow Line -- beam former Cost,
Wire Flex -- switch filter Tooling
Cycle Time
5 6 Flow Line -- beam former Safety
RF Washers Shop Process Book
6 11 Flow Line -- beam former Methods Improvement
Staffing
Tooling Requests
7 7 Metal Foil Line of Balance Graphs
Quality Graphs
8 7 12 Auto Weld Sale Team Book
RTV Potting -- switch filter
9 temp RTV Potting -- beam former (none)
EMI Potting -- switch filter
10 7 Assemble Flex, Tray, & Cover Labor Approval
11 temp Potting (none)
12 3 12 Unit Test Conflict Resolution
Assembly Instructions
In-process Quality Graph
Source: Switch Filter/Beam Former Team.
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Quality Control
The quality control process provides an excellent example of how worker
participation can not only support, but actually advance progress toward the company’s
objectives. Prior to adopting self-directed work teams, TI DSEG relied heavily on
inspection to ensure quality. After completing their assigned tasks, workers simply
passed each board down the line to the next production station without any mechanism
for detecting production defects. MCB controlled quality only at the end of the line,
during final assembly and test. Here, quality inspectors rejected any guidance system that
failed to meet the product’s specifications. Rework specialists would then try to find and
fix the problems in rejected units. If they could not do so successfully, they would have to
scrap the bad unit.
This approach suffered from several critical flaws that the teaming concept has
since corrected. First, the old quality control process depended entirely upon inspection
rather than prevention. Catching defects at the end of the line did nothing to prevent
defects from occurring in the first place -- it was already too late. Second, it was much
more difficult to pinpoint and correct specific defects for a completed system than it
would have been for any individual circuit board. The Assembly & Test group relied
heavily on trial-and-error to identify a bad part or weak solder joint. Rework specialists
might replace a part on a rejected circuit board in the hope of fixing the problem. It didn’t
always work. As a result, rework could take a long time and become very costly. Third,
scrapped systems represented an enormous heap of wasted resources. Every resource that
the rejected unit had consumed since the process first introduced the defect went
completely to waste. If workers had detected the problem earlier, they could have either
fixed it right away or avoided wasting any additional resources down the line. Finally,
inspection is inherently limited because it merely controls final product quality while it
offers no means for improving the quality of the underlying process.
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A New Approach
The arrival of self-directed work teams at MCB brought with it an entirely new
quality control process. MCB has taken advantage of three key attributes of the team
concept -- total participation, continuous improvement, and the quality principle -- to
overhaul its quality control methods. First, total participation has allowed MCB to make
QC an integrated part of the overall production process. One of the earliest steps in
developing self-directed teams was to certify team members in quality control, thereby
allowing them to perform QC on their own work.
The Switch Filter/Beam Former Team has already achieved 100 percent QC
certification -- all twelve members have completed the three-day training course and
passed the required practical test. Upon completing any production task, workers inspect
their own output to identify any defects that might exist. As a result, the workers uncover
most problems at their source, and can immediately correct the problems before they
snowball during continued processing -- and waste additional resources.
Second, total participation opens the door for continuous improvement. By
eliminating the long delay between production processing and final inspection, integrated
quality control allows workers to begin seeing patterns of cause and effect between
processing conditions and the occurrence of specific defects. Furthermore, the intimate
knowledge of the production process that resides with shop floor workers gives them an
ideal perspective to identify and implement process improvements. TI DSEG has
provided workers a mechanism -- the Method Improvement Report, or MIR -- to propose
and document potential process improvements. Process engineers study and usually
approve these MIRs; the new methods then not only become standardized for the team
where they originated, but also disseminate to other teams as well.
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Third, the new QC process embodies the Japanese concept of Jidoka, the Quality
Principle (see page 19 for the definition). In the MCB shop, the responsibility for fixing a
problem resides with the person who created the problem; as a result, workers have an
excellent incentive to do things right the first time. Their direct involvement in QC
provides them with a clear understanding that building quality into the production process
in the first place eliminates the need to inspect the final product for defect later on.
Customer Focus
Organizing the production process into self-directed work teams has created an
interlocking network of customer-supplier relationships among all of the shops involved
in manufacturing the HARM missile. The MCB shop, for example, receives blank circuit
boards from TI’s Austin facility. The Austin crew sends people to visit MCB about once-
a-month to see if the shop is having any difficulties in processing the circuit boards. As a
result, Austin can develop a good understanding of the needs of its customers, the MCB
production teams, and can respond quickly as those needs change or as specific problems
arise. If something major comes up, of course, the Austin people come up to Lewisville
right away -- the earlier they can correct the problem, the less likely it becomes that MCB
will generate a pile of defective circuit boards.
Likewise, the Switch Filter/Beam Former Team (and other MCB teams) maintain
close contact with their own customers. For example, as the SF/BF team finishes a batch
of circuit boards each day, one member typically delivers the boards to the guidance
system assembly area upstairs. “If there are any problems with the boards, believe me,
I’ll hear about it,” says the worker. The team receives customer feedback immediately
and frequently.
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The Remaining Role for Inspection
The new QC process has not eliminated inspection entirely. The last step in the
process for assembling switch filters, for example, involves testing the units. One
member of the SF/BF team devotes his time to the task of measuring the frequency
response and other electronic characteristics of the circuit boards. If a board fails to meet
tight specifications, the technician can often pinpoint the exact problem right away. In
fact, the testing procedures themselves provide a wealth of diagnostic information that
helps him locate the root cause of the defect. Furthermore, he can in some cases fix the
problem himself, or in other cases simply hand the board back to the appropriate team
member for a quick rework job.
Although this step still qualifies as inspection, it is a clear improvement over the
end-of-the-line inspection in the old flow-line days. Now, the unit test takes place much
closer, both physically and in time, to the source of the defect than under the old method.
As a result, the team uncovers systematic defects much earlier, before the process spits
out a pile of rejects. More important, the new system provides the team with an
opportunity to improve the process in ways that will avoid defects in the future.
Performance Evaluation
The SF/BF Team has recently adopted a new method of evaluating each worker’s
performance. Team members first seek feedback from their peers. Based on this
information, they then write up their own evaluations, including areas of good
performance, areas that need some improvement, and plans for taking action. Finally,
they present the evaluations to the team facilitator.
Before adopting this new system, members of the team received performance
evaluations once-a-year, although some workers wanted to receive feedback more
frequently, perhaps quarterly. The evaluation process depended on the same evaluation
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forms that supervisors wrote-up under the old Taylorist production system. These
questionnaires were long and tedious -- filling them out could take two or three hours.
The criteria for evaluating performance included dependability, productivity, safety,
teamwork, and quality.
MCB is also discussing a proposal for yet another evaluation method. The whole
team would sit together in a conference room and evaluate the performance of one
worker. Going around the table, each member would comment on the worker’s
performance during the most recent few months. One week later, the person would
present a corrective action plan to the team; a week after that, the team would discuss the
worker’s progress toward the plan. Meanwhile, the team would have started evaluating
the performance of a second and third worker. Repeating this process for each member of
the team in turn, the team could evaluate all twelve members once each quarter.
One vital consideration is the purpose of the evaluations. MCB intends to use this
technique only as a method to allow people to improve their performance. The
evaluations will not have any impact on base pay or bonuses. Round-table evaluations
offer two key advantages: first, they allow people to learn from their own mistakes and
successes; and second, they allow people to learn from the mistakes and successes of
others as well. To increase the effectiveness of the program, workers attend classes to
learn how to give constructive criticism -- and how to avoid attacking each other.
Training
TI will make 32 hours of training available to each employee during the current
year, up from 24 hours last year. The plan next year calls for 40 hours per employee.
Training includes certification in production tasks, safety procedures, quality
improvement process, teamwork skills, communications, and other management skills.
Training serves two objects: (1) to certify each team member in all of the team’s
production tasks, and (2) to give team members the skills they need to deal with business
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and administrative issues. Each team works out a training schedule for all of its members.
Teams then schedule additional work hours as needed to keep up with the Line of
Balance during training courses.
Weekly Production Meeting
The team has a regular production meeting once-a-week. All members of the
team, plus the team facilitator, attend these meetings. Discussion centers around both
production and administrative issues. The team can review the schedule and make plans
for the coming week regarding work hours, training sessions, the Line of Balance, and
any planned absences or vacations. Workers can bring specific production, quality, or
inter-personal problems to the attention of the entire team, and discussion can focus on
finding appropriate solutions. Each member also makes a brief presentation to update the
team on each of the Starpoint activities.
Helping Other Teams
Workers in the MCB shop can monitor the current Line of Balance of all of the
MCB teams. The computer system makes the data readily available at every work station.
If one team falls behind the LOB, workers from other teams will pitch in to help the team
catch up. This kind of cooperation is possible because the workers know how to do more
than just a single job. Moreover, MCB provides strong incentives for teams to cooperate
in optimizing the performance of the shop-as-a-whole rather than individual teams.
Performance Measures
MCB places great emphasis on reducing manufacturing costs. The SF/BF Team
focuses on one metric in particular, A/E, or Actual/Earned hours. A/E measures the ratio
of actual time divided by earned, or standard, time for any given activity. SF/BF tracks
A/E for production time, queue time, touch time, scrap, and overhead. Earned time
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includes not only the target time, but also break time and personal breaks. Workers log
their hours onto the computer system, which then calculates and records A/E for each
component.
The process has changed greatly since SF/BF originally measured the target
times. The team coordinator is currently updating new targets to reflect the current
process. As the teams continue to improve the processes in the future, they will need to
measure the target times on a regular basis, perhaps once-a-year.
MCB’s management looks at A/E very carefully. The group believes that A/E
influences manufacturing costs. DSEG receives fixed revenue regardless of its costs. As a
result, keeping costs in line has become exceedingly important.
Production Decline and Layoffs
Spending reductions at the Pentagon continue to take a toll on TI DSEG. The Line
of Balance for HARM missile production used to be thirteen per day. Currently, it stands
at nine. And DSEG is already planning to cut back again, to just six per day. The
company also has plans to reduce the HARM program’s workforce by 30 percent in the
third and fourth quarters of 1994. That amounts to approximately 100 people.
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Diamond Point Turning Team
The Diamond Point Turning Team manufactures high-precision optical
components for various DSEG programs. DPT team members operate a sophisticated
machine shop located in the Optics Department at the Forest Lane production complex in
Dallas. DPT delivers both standard and custom-made components primarily to other
groups or programs within DSEG, although the team occasionally fills orders for external
customers as well. The team uses diamond point machining technology to impart specific
surface geometries onto bulk materials within extremely precise tolerances. Customers
use these components -- including custom lenses, flat and curved-surface mirrors, and
snap-together housings -- as the optical elements in a variety of devices for both military
and commercial applications. DPT makes elements that operate at either infrared or
visible wavelengths. Materials include germanium, gallium arsenide, silicon, aluminum,
copper, and gold. As an example of the DPT’s work, Exhibit 10 shows a schematic
diagram of a Schmidt-Cassegrain telephoto assembly. DPT manufactures the precision-
machined primary and secondary mirrors for this device.
Production Process
Producing a large variety of parts in low-volume runs, DPT structures its work
flow as a simple job-shop. The shop occupies a 3,200 square foot clean room and an
adjacent support area. A controlled environment in the clean room maintains a constant
temperature of 68°–  1°  F. and humidity of 55%. –  5%. The room houses many large
machines, including three diamond-point lathes (two- and three-axis), three diamond-
point flycutters, a conventional CNC lathe, a small engine lathe, and a boring mill. In
addition, DPT uses any of several interferometers and profilometers located in the shop to
measure the dimensions and characterize the optical properties of finished components.
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The diamond-point equipment uses single-crystal diamonds mounted on vibration-free
frames to cut geometries at a resolution of 1 microinch.25
Many parts that DPT produces are custom, one-time runs. Some are standard
production part numbers for which the team maintains process sheets, last-run data
sheets, and stock tooling. In addition, some customers may periodically re-order small
quantities of some particular custom-made part. When DPT introduces a new,
standardized component into production, the team usually experiences a definite learning
curve -- unit costs often decrease dramatically over time as the team accumulates
experience with the new component.
Exhibit 10
Diamond Point Turning Team
Precision Optical Components
Schmidt-Cassegrain Telephoto Assembly
---> Cylindrical device pictured in cross-section, on-axis <---
                                                
25One microinch is approximately 250 Ångstroms.  This resolution is 20 or 25 times smaller than the
wavelengths of visible light!
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TI DSEG established the diamond point turning operation in 1981. The DPT work
group had always maintained a strong level of independence within the Optics
Department, for two reasons: (1) The need to work in a certified clean room kept the
group physically separated from other production groups; and (2) the highly skilled,
specialized nature of the diamond point machining process gave the group a large degree
of organizational freedom as well. As a result, the DPT work group stood out as a clear
candidate to transition from supervised group to self-directed team. In June of 1992, after
spending six month redesigning its manufacturing activities, the Optics Department
officially designated DPT as a self-directed work team.
DPT has eleven members -- seven machinists and four opticians. All of these
workers are highly skilled specialists and craftspeople. In addition, the team has the
support of a team facilitator and a process engineer. The DPT shop operates two shifts-a-
day, five days-a-week. Team members rotate machines periodically, about every two or
three years. Changing machines often requires additional training and skill upgrades,
particularly on more advanced machines.
Soon after its initial inception, the DPT team adopted a formal transition plan to
become self-directed. The transition plan sets out goals for starting team activities and
taking on additional responsibilities, as well as a time frame for the completion of each
item. These goals include:
• establishing regular team meetings
• creating a process for setting goals
• documenting all shop processes
• developing SQC methods and measuring progress toward six-sigma
• building infrastructure and support systems to
- track key performance metrics
- analyze variances
- interface with customers
- keep records on attendance and MIRs
- set annual budgets
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Every month, DPT submits a written report to the department manager outlining the
team’s progress relative to the plan. In addition, DPT (along with other teams) makes a
presentation to the Quality Improvement Thrust, which the manager chairs.
Process Improvement
Among the earliest tasks that DPT completed as a team was to document the
shop’s entire production process as a comprehensive set of flow charts. Although this
exercise took a lot of time and effort, it proved a worthwhile investment. Once
completed, the process flow diagrams became a valuable tool in uncovering wasteful
processes and identifying potential improvements. As one machinist described it, “It’s
kind of funny when the people who actually do the process sit down and say, ‘What can I
do to improve this process?’ ” Exhibit 11 shows the result. The number of Method
Improvement Reports that DPT implemented in 1993 was 70 percent higher than in 1991.
During its first year as a self-directed team, from June of 1992 through June of 1993,
DPT adopted 121 MIRs -- and created $140,000 in annual savings. MIR participation
was not limited to just a few operators; rather, every team member contributed ten or
more MIRs during 1993. In addition, the team initiated thirty-eight safety improvements
in 1993, which proactively reduced the likelihood of an accident.
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Exhibit 11
Diamond Point Turning Team
Method Improvement Reports
36% increase in participation since team formation
Realized $140,000 Savings from 6/92 to 6/93
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As an example of the impact that involving workers in process improvement can
have, consider Exhibit 12. The top panel shows the original process flow for one high
volume part, while the bottom panel shows a redesigned process for the same part after
the team developed several improvements. Team members simplified the process by
eliminating two of three queuing delays and consolidating processing from four
operations to just two. The team’s effort paid off big -- the new process yielded annual
savings of $43,400, and simultaneously improved quality.
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Quality Control
Like the SF/BF Team, DPT has achieved 100 percent certification of its members
in TQC. Operators perform QC on their own work -- DPT has no need for a separate QC
person to inspect finished parts. “Doing your own QC cuts out a whole operation,” said
one team member. “We QC our own work. That cuts down wait time, cuts labor costs
and cycle time. Most people know when they’re doing a good job.”
The team focuses heavily on building quality into the process rather than merely
inspecting the final product for defects. DPT routinely uses the tools of Statistical Quality
Control to monitor and control the production process. In fact, DPT has adopted a very
aggressive target for one key SQC metric: defects per million opportunities. The
transition plan explicitly sets out the objective to achieve a process quality level of six-
sigma, which corresponds to just 3.4 defects per million opportunities. Given DPT’s
current volume and product mix, the process experiences only 150,000 opportunities each
year26 -- leaving room for only half-a-defect per year! To achieve six-sigma, therefore,
the team has in effect accepted Phillip Crosby’s challenge to aim for zero defects.27
In practice, of course, no process can ever eliminate defects entirely, but it is a worthy
goal nonetheless. As Exhibit 14 demonstrates, DPT’s quality has made a dramatic improvement
over the last few years -- defects per million opportunities have dropped from 2,000 in 1988 to
less than 200 in 1993, a decrease of more than ten-to-one in just four years. The team tracks the
trailing six-week average DPMO and the corresponding sigma on a weekly basis. Exhibit 13
shows the calculation of DPMO and sigma for a six-week period in late-1993 and early-1994.
During this period, DPT incurred only two defects on the 600 parts that the team processed,
yielding 128 defects per million opportunities or 5.2 sigma. For all of 1993, DPT’s weekly
sigma hovered between 4.7 and 5.3, and averaged about 5.1 sigma for the year.
                                                
26This figure assumes approximately 26 opportunities per part on average.
27Crosby.
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Exhibit 13
Diamond Point Turning Team
Statistical Quality Control
December–January, 1993–94
Defects per
Shop Parts Defects per million
week Defects processed 1000 parts opportunitiesa Sigma
49 1 121 8.3 318 4.9
50 0 98 0.0 0 6.0
51 0 84 0.0 0 6.0
52b 0 0 (n.c.) (n.c.) (n.c.)
1 1 132 7.6 291 4.9
2 0 165 0.0 0 6.0
Total 2 600 3.3 128       5.2  
a assumes 26 opportunities per part on average.
b Christmas & New Year holidays.
Source: Diamond Point Turning Team.
Maintenance
In addition to QC, operators also take care of routine equipment maintenance on a
daily basis. According to one team member, “We try to keep these machines pretty clean.
We do a pretty good cleaning job everyday -- just general-type maintenance.” Ensuring
the quality of the production process, of course, depends critically upon carrying out a
regular schedule of preventive maintenance. Including maintenance among the regular
day-to-day tasks of the shop floor operators frees up staff Repair & Maintenance
specialists (external to the team) to deal only with major equipment failures. As a result,
the department can reallocate a number of maintenance specialists and their associated
overhead expense. Furthermore, self-directed maintenance eliminates the perverse
64
incentives inherent in standard cost accounting systems that actually penalize profit- and
cost center managers for investing in preventive maintenance.
Customer Focus
DPT’s members have embraced the customer-focus idea in virtually all of their
activities. DPT makes custom parts primarily for internal TI manufacturing programs,
although on occasion the team fills orders from outside companies. Order volumes are
typically small, and customers expect a quick turnaround. DPT understands what its
customers want: high quality, low cost, and on-time delivery. In fact, to gain a better
understanding of customer needs, one team member is planning to create a customer
survey that he will send out quarterly to receive feedback from end-users.
Because of the extremely tight tolerances on the precision optics that DPT
manufactures, final product quality is absolutely paramount. “You can’t afford to let
anything out that doesn’t meet quality standards,” says one team member. For all of
1993, the team released only a single part that failed during customer use. DPT had
placed its quality stamp on a part they could not check fully. As a result of this failure,
the team changed its policy and no longer places the stamp on any part it cannot test.
65
100
1,000
10,000
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
4 s
5 s
DPT
Exhibit 14
Diamond Point Turning Team
Defects per Million Opportunities
Source:  Diamond Point Turning Team.
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Administrative Process
Like the SF/BF team, DPT assigns starpoint tasks to each of its members.
Starpoint duties include Production Control, Methods & Tooling, Administration,
Quality, and Safety. Exhibit 15 describes the specific responsibilities and the needed
qualifications for each starpoint. Each starpoint task follows one or two relevant metrics,
and tracks them on graphs and charts. “Everything a supervisor would do, we do by
ourselves, within our boundaries,” says one team member. The team set up a front desk
that everyone shares for administrative tasks. Located at the front desk is a 486 personal
computer with a laser printer. The team keeps track of time usage carefully; records
indicate that starpoint tasks take about six minutes of every available hour (Exhibit 17).
The team rotates starpoint tasks every year, but never forces anyone to learn skills they
don’t want to know. Nevertheless, DSEG requires every team member to complete a
certain minimum number of hours of training each year. Training often takes the form of
business or management classes.
DPT has personal computers at many, but not all, of its work stations. Although
the department originally installed the PCs to control the lathe machines, some team
members now use the computers for administrative tasks as well. “While you sit and
watch your machine run you can do a whole lot of stuff between cuts. It actually helps
your productivity. You couldn’t watch your machine and go over to the central computer
at the same time -- your machine would have to sit idle.” The team has set a goal to put a
PC at every work station. Meanwhile, everyone is taking PC training classes, and the
team is investing in additional software tools. DPT is also considering a networking
connection to Forest Lane’s central file server, which has a large collection of software.
Every Wednesday, the team meets with the Optics Department managers. They
discuss the current situation in DPT, and present the team’s metrics to the first-level
manager, the cost center manager, and the manufacturing people.
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Hiring Process
The administrative activities of a self-directed work team can even include hiring
new members. Some time after its inception, DPT went to the department manager with a
request for an additional person. The team needed more help, and justified it to the
manager. He agreed, but asked the team to consider only candidates from inside the
optics organization.
DPT developed an entire hiring process. The team created a list of questions for
candidates, and asked Human Resources to look it over. The team then interviewed
candidates. Each applicant met with three team members one-on-one. The entire team
then met to discuss the three best candidates. They hammered out a consensus decision
during a four-hour meeting. The team chose the person based not only on production
skills, but also on personality characteristics and on how well the candidate would fit in
with the rest of the team.
Performance Metrics
As we discussed in the previous section, team members track one or two
performance metrics related to their specific starpoint tasks. The team pays particular
attention to defects per million opportunities and the associated sigma, on-time delivery,
cycle time, output, MIR participation, attendance, and safety. 
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Exhibit 15
Diamond Point Turning Team
Starpoint Task Descriptions
Attributes Responsibilities
Administration
Good communication skills Team communications
Computer literate Present weekly status meeting
Knowledge of products & processes Overhead charge number control
Knowledge of TI policies & procedures Team metrics -- charts & graphs
Understand statistical principles Liaison for overtime scheduling
Monitor budget -- 2nd shift
Methods & Tooling
Good communicator Research proposed routing changes
Good organizational skills Instigate valid routing changes
Understand product flow Update current routers
Computer literate Help design, build, & modify tooling
Understand tooling design & function Monitor diamond cutters
Understand calibration procedures Monitor equipment calibration schedules
Production Control
Good communicator PCS/DXS training
Good organizational skills Track cycle time & delinquencies (graph)
Understand product flow Daily hot parts meeting
Familiar with PCS/DXS Liaison for scheduling work
Computer literate
Quality
Good communicator Interface with customers on quality issues
Familiar with operating procedures Monitor compliance with shop processes
Familiar with shop processes Quality statistical data (6-sigma graph)
Familiar with part testing procedures Liaison for quality updates (QOI, TQC)
Familiar with statistical indices
Continues --->
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Exhibit 15 -- Continued
Attributes Responsibilities
Safety
Good communicator Housekeeping & safety audits
Safe role model Age control audits
Knowledge of requirements (OSHA) Chemical handling audits
Trained in emergency response, first aid, Render first aid as needed
and CPR Monitor degreaser and solvents
Flow Gemini Control (on 2nd shirt)
Source: Diamond Point Turning Team
Exhibit 16
Diamond Point Turning Team
Mission & Vision Statements
Mission Statement
The mission of the Diamond Point Turning Self-Directed Work Team is to create an
environment which supports and encourages self-management, versatility, innovation,
involvement, and commitment in each one of its members.
Vision Statement
The vision of the Diamond Point Turning Self-Directed Work Team is for the Diamond
Point Turning Shop to be a world class supplier:
• Totally committed to customer requirements
• Whose people have ownership and involvement in the work process
• Using cross-functional teamwork to achieve customer satisfaction
• Contributing to company profitability
Source: Diamond Point Turning Team.
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Exhibit 17
Diamont Point Turning Team
Average Hourly Time Usage
Starpoints
6.4 min
Production
53.6 min
12
3
6
9
1
2
4
7
8
10
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Incentive Structures
Implementing self-directed work team brings about a wholesale change in
organizational culture. Any complex organization, such as a large manufacturing
company, depends on a number of key support systems -- information technology,
policies and procedures, rewards and recognition programs -- to function on a daily basis.
Such infrastructure evolves over a long period of time and largely reflects the company’s
culture and traditions. Systems, however, can take on a life of their own, and may not
respond very quickly to sudden changes in the environment. As the self-directed team
concept has taken root at TI DSEG, the old infrastructure has remained in place. DSEG’s
High Performing Organizations Development Group (HPOD) recognized the existence of
a disconnect between the systems and the culture, and began considering ways of
developing infrastructure to fit the new reality.
Job Class Consolidation
TI DSEG has historically assigned each worker to any of more than 100 different
job classifications -- production, maintenance, administrative, quality control, and so on.
Within each classification, the company further grouped workers into one of several job
grades (anywhere from five to eleven grades per classification). All told, DSEG
maintained more than 500 different combinations of classes and grades for its employees.
Naturally, pay scales depended largely on job classification and grade. Unfortunately, the
classifications and job grades no longer served any useful business purpose. Worse, the
excessive complexity and petty jealousies of the old classification scheme could
potentially undermine the objectives of the self-directed team program.
To address these issues, HPOD set up a new initiative called Job Class
Consolidation. JCC reduces the number of job classifications to just a handful, and
eventually eliminates job grades altogether. For example, JCC classifies all members of
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manufacturing teams under a single title -- Production Associate. As a result, the
company no longer differentiates people by something meaningless like job class.
Instead, the focus has shifted to the knowledge and skills each person brings to the table,
and the performance of the team as a whole.
Alternative Reward Systems
Rewards and recognition programs can have a dramatic impact on the behavior of
managers and workers alike. The success of any new initiative, especially one so fragile
as self-directed work teams, depends critically on installing effective incentives that
encourage constructive behaviors and discourage destructive ones. For teaming to
succeed, HPOD needed to devise an alternative reward system for TI DSEG. The result
of this effort is the Pride and Share program.
Pride and Share combines elements of pay-for-knowledge and pay-for-
performance into a dual program that creates incentives supporting a variety of objectives
at a variety of organizational levels. Where job grades once determined pay scales, now
the Pride and Share program will take over. HPOD is currently piloting the program in
three limited work areas, including the MCB shop. The pilots involve approximately 180
people in total. At the end of a year, HPOD will fully evaluate the pilots, make revisions,
and begin to spread Pride and Share to additional work areas. The design and
development of the philosophy and methods will take about three years.
Pride Model
Pride, or “process for investing in development,” uses a pay-for-knowledge model
to encourage individual workers to develop their technical and management skills. The
purpose of the program is twofold: (1) to empower workers with the skills they will need
to contribute effectively as team members, and (2) to develop the capability of every
team to function without direct supervision and to manage its own operations.
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Pride follows a straightforward pay-for-knowledge model. First, as we mentioned
in the previous section, JCC eliminates needless distinctions between team members by
folding the myriad job classes into one -- Production Associate. Second, the Pride model
establishes a matrix of competencies related to regular production activities plus the new
administrative and support tasks for which the team will gradually take responsibility.
The Team Level -- consisting of team-specific core knowledge, general business
knowledge, and basic support skills -- provides the minimum foundation of competencies
necessary to certify as a Production Associate. The remainder of the matrix divides skill
blocks into three advanced levels -- Support, Coordination, and Strategic. At each level,
specific competencies fall within one of five categories -- Leadership & Development,
Administrative, Planning, Process Improvement, and Output (technical skills). The
hourly wage of an individual worker will then depend on the depth and breadth of skills
and competencies that person masters through training and certification. As members of
the team grow individually, and as the team itself becomes more competent and mature, it
gradually absorbs additional supervisory and support functions. After a moderate period
of development and growth, the team eventually evolves into a fully mature, self-directed
work unit.
Share Program
Share, or “shared achievement and reward,” adds a pay-for-performance
component to the Pride model. Share differs from Pride on three important dimensions.
First, pay scales under Pride depend on skill levels and knowledge, whereas Share pays
out depending on business performance. Second, Pride determines hourly base wages,
whereas Share offers periodic lump-sum bonuses. Third, Pride links wage levels to
actions of individual workers, while Share’s pay-out depends on the performance of
integrated work areas comprising many self-directed teams. This last distinction is by far
the most important. Share creates incentives not only for individuals to work together as
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teammates, but also for teams to work together as integrated business units. In so doing,
Share tries to pick the correct optimization point. It accounts for the complex and
dynamic dependencies that exist across teams, and avoids driving a wedge between
teams. Finding the right optimization point takes a careful balance. Paying bonuses for
individual performance often causes sub-optimization and destructive petty rivalries.
Paying bonuses for performance company-wide, on the other extreme, leaves people with
no understanding of the outcome or any sense of control over performance. Finding the
right middle ground between these two extremes is difficult.
Share pays out a lump-sum payment to each business unit for achieving certain
quarterly goals. The business unit sets the goals in terms of four key metrics -- total cost,
quality, cycle time, and on-time delivery. Managers, team members, and customers
negotiate with one another to determine by consensus six levels of goal attainment. The
lowest level is a step above the baseline trend, and the highest level a true stretch goal
requiring dramatic improvement. At the end of each quarter, the business unit calculates a
weighted scoring of the four measurements, which teams track on a weekly basis, and
compares the results to the previously determined levels of attainment. The Share
program then pays a bonus to the business unit; the size of the pay-out depends on which
level the department attained. Each person receives an equal portion of the pay-out.
Business units can choose to change the weighting factors on each of the four metrics. If
the unit wanted to focus on a specific problem related to, for example, defect rates, it
might choose to increase the weight of the quality metric and reduce the weight of the
others.
Teaming for Excellence Award
The Teaming for Excellence Award, another HPOD initiative, serves two
important purposes: (1) the award gives teams some added incentive to achieve higher
levels of excellence in business performance; and (2) much like an internal version of the
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Malcolm Baldridge Award, Teaming for Excellence provides teams with a ready-made
framework within which to measure their progress in several critical areas. The selection
process asks each applicant team to rate itself in each of five categories -- planning and
strategy, customer and supplier relationships, process improvement, resource
management, and team development. The application consists of a questionnaire asking
seventy questions. Teams check off yes/no responses, and provide data to back up their
answers. HPOD judges the applications , and invites teams scoring better than 50 points
out of the possible 70 to participate in interviews. The group then awards Gold, Silver,
and Bronze prizes to teams showing strength in four of the five categories. In addition,
teams can earn awards for excellence in a single category.
Teaming for Excellence is currently in its third year. The Diamond Point Turning
Team received the Bronze award in the first year, and Gold in the second. Although
teams receive no monetary reward, the Gold winner attends a banquet dinner with the
company president and other managers. Gold team members may also attend a one-day
seminar of the team’s choice. All award recipients receive individual trophies, plus a
team plaque.
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    Conclusion
The SF/BF and DPT teams have enjoyed great success in transforming from a
traditional organizational structure to the self-directed work team concept. Nevertheless,
both teams have certainly had their share of ups and downs along the way, and the work
is by no means complete. Moreover, not all teams at TI DSEG have achieved quite the
same level of maturity as SF/BF and DPT -- at least not yet. DSEG has a vision of where
the organization is going, and the teams are working toward realizing that vision. In fact,
successful lean producers understand that their work is never done. Continuous
improvement and workforce flexibility enable companies to respond quickly as markets
change quickly. As a result, the hallmark of lean production is permanent change.
The next two sections will present, in concluding this paper, some of the key
success factors that helped the SF/BF and DPT teams transition to the self-directed
model, and some of the obstacles they had to overcome along the way. Finally, the last
section will offer a recommendation regarding performance measurement.
Key Success Factors
Self-directed work teams offer a number of advantages to manufacturing
companies. Success, however, is by no means guaranteed. Transformation from a
traditional hierarchical organization to self-directed work teams depends on many critical
success factors. The shop floor workers and team facilitators at TI DSEG have identified
three particularly important factors from their own experience: (1) management
commitment, (2) highly motivated workers, and (3) wide open communication.
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Management Commitment
Self-directed work teams cannot happen unless upper- and middle-level managers
support the concept fully. First, senior managers set out the vision and provide the
leadership that the organization needs. The direct involvement of the CEO and the other
top executives sends a clear message to everyone that the success of the team initiative is
of paramount importance to the organization. Second, the fledgling teams need the
coordination and support of good middle managers to get started and to keep going,
especially in the face of temporary setbacks during the initial phase-in. “Management
supported us, they really did. We could come to them with anything, and they were there
for us,” recalls one member of the SF/BF team. “If something didn’t work out the way we
planned, they’d come in and support us.” Another worker describes how the former
supervisor helped the team out: “She got us on the right track. She figured out the target
times, who needed to do what, and distributed the work load evenly.”
After the teams are up and running, they still need management to support their
ideas for improvements. “If we go to [the department manager] with a big proposal, and
show him we need it, he’ll look at it, and if it’s good for everybody, we’ll get it,” says a
member of DPT. “Sometimes, of course, he does turn us down.” The key point is not that
the manager simply approves every idea, but rather that he listens carefully and considers
all ideas fully.
Highly Motivated Workers
Management commitment is important. But it is the team members themselves
who make the teams a reality, and that takes a lot of hard work. The program can only
succeed with a highly motivated group of workers. Setting up a new team can require
long hours each day, involves a lot of training, and can lead to a certain amount of
conflict and stress. The SF/BF and DPT teams owe their success in part to the high levels
of motivation of the team members. “Our team just wanted it to work. It helped that
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everyone was dedicated to getting it done. We did whatever it took -- worked ten hour
days, came in on Saturdays -- we wanted to make it work,” said one SF/BF team
member. Another worker agreed: “We were the pilot team -- we were determined to
make it work . . . .It was a challenge. When you’re handed a challenge, you want to make
it.” One DPT member described something similar: “What really holds the team together
is we got one heck of a group of good conscientious people.”
Wide Open Communication
The success of self-directed work teams depends critically on open, direct, and
honest communication, not only among members of a given team, but also among teams
within the same department, and between teams and department managers. Some of the
reasons for the importance of open communication include its role in coordinating the
operating activities of inter-dependent work teams, and the need to alert everyone when
specific problems arise. “We communicate so much that if there’s a problem, we know
it,” says one member of the SF/BF team. Workers also need to receive feedback on their
performance. Says one team facilitator, “I tell ’em all day long how they’re doing -- good
or bad. They don’t wonder how they’re doing at the end of six months.” Most important,
openness undermines the formation of bad blood between people whenever conflicts
arise, and conflicts will always arise. “People do not hold grudges -- they got something
to say, they say it,” explains a shop floor worker.
Obstacles or Barriers
Any company attempting to initiate self-directed work teams cannot
underestimate the importance of nurturing these success factors. Nevertheless, a number
of obstacles or barriers can potentially block the path of even the most carefully planned
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implementation plan. These obstacles include excessive workload and resistance to
change.
Excessive Workload
The SF/BF team piloted the self-directed team program for the MCB shop. The
team was understaffed at the beginning. Management expected eight hours of production
work from each worker, plus completion of the needed training classes. “They supported
us, but they didn’t really understand what we had to go through until we explained it to
them,” recalled one worker. Another agreed, “Trying to keep up with production and go
to classes all the time, that was the biggest frustration we had. We survived, it doesn’t
seem like nothing now.” Management explained the team process to the SF/BF team, but
left the rest of MCB in the dark for several months. The team members initially worked
twelve hours-a-day to keep up with the workload, and management allowed them to take
as much overtime as needed. Some of the other workers became jealous of all the
overtime they were taking. “You still have to get the product out so it’s hard to find the
time for all the other stuff.”
The Diamond Point Turning Team also had some difficulty adjusting to the
workload initially. “It was a whole new way of life. It was difficult to make the transition,
to do your job and all the extra stuff now that goes along with it,” said one team member.
The team adjusted quickly, however, and found some relief in better cooperation. “We
can tell who’s overloaded. All you gotta do is say in our meeting you’re overloaded and
someone will jump in to help -- it works real well. You gotta spread the load.”
Resistance to change
People always find change inherently threatening or uncomfortable; as a result,
people at all levels of the company will throw obstacles in the way of organizational
change. Shop floor workers resist moving to new jobs. “I didn’t want to do flow line,”
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remembers one member of the SF/BF team. “I couldn’t see myself doing flow line work,
but now I do it.” This obstacle typically appears early in the implementation phase. The
best remedy involves offering strong management support to the teams, and providing
adequate training to allow workers to change jobs with ease.
Once teams begin redesigning the production process, they face a whole new
round of hurdles. “Why do you want to change what you’ve been doing for 10 years?”
asks one worker. He answers his own question, “Just ’cause we’ve done it for 10 years
doesn’t make it right.” This barrier is a little more difficult to surmount. Part of the
solution involves strong leadership and changing the company culture from accepting
business-as-usual to expecting continuous improvement. Another part of the solution lies
with the company’s incentive structures, both formal and informal. Devising effective
pay-for-performance and pay-for-knowledge systems, offering high-profile awards, and
emphasizing the right performance metrics can all have a dramatic impact on the
willingness of people to participate in improvement activities.
Supervisors, perhaps more than the team members themselves, feel highly
threatened facing the prospect of self-directed work teams. “When a manager or
supervisor resists empowering the workers, it becomes almost impossible to get it done,”
asserts a team facilitator. Managers and supervisors have a great deal invested in
maintaining the status quo. Often, they owe their positions of power and authority to their
ability to excel within the very organizational model that self-directed work teams aim to
overthrow -- traditional corporate hierarchy. Moreover, to the extent that they perceive a
threat to their own power and influence, they will find ways to undermine and destroy the
source of that threat. In the case of self-directed work teams, supervisors who fear losing
their influence -- or worse, their jobs -- may quickly transform into wolves dressed in
sheep’s clothing. While openly espousing the principles of empowerment and
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participation, they covertly do everything in their power to torpedo all attempts at actual
implementation.
The wolves, however, cannot hide forever. If senior management fully commits to
the success of organizational change, resistive supervisors and middle managers will
either leave the company on their own initiative, or risk losing their jobs. Supervisors
who embrace the team concept, on the other hand, and who can adapt to a new and
different role, will often become excellent team facilitators or coordinators. DPT’s
experience illustrates this point quite well.
Before DSEG adopted self-directed work teams, DPT had three supervisors. As
the team began to take on administrative responsibilities, DPT lost two of the supervisors
to attrition, while the third became a team facilitator. Some of the team members
suggested that this particular supervisor survived the transition because of his willingness
to embrace organizational change and to adapt to the new role that facilitator represented.
“We couldn’t have a better facilitator,” said one worker. “He’s not at all threatened by
anybody getting credit for anything.” Another machinist called the facilitator “a hands-off
kind-of-guy. He’s an ideal facilitator. [He] didn’t have any trouble letting go of his
authority.” The facilitator described his new role as follows:
“I realized these guys knew what they were doing. They don’t need me to
tell them what to do. If I had to carry a big stick, I would -- but I don’t
have to.
“They’ve taken over a lot of my tasks. I feel like I’m a resource for them
more than anything. Maybe I need to give them a suggestion but not tell
them what to do.
“I always try to give them the credit. I don’t try to ride their coattails.
When they do peer reviews, I think they’re harder on each other than I am.
We have a really good working relationship -- we understand each other.
“I had some apprehension [at first]. But this is something we wanted,
something that will help them. We’ll just make the most of it.”
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A good facilitator strikes a careful balance between maintaining excessive control
over the team versus allowing the team to take on too much responsibility too soon.
“You’ve got to have [a supervisor] willing to turn you loose,” says one DPT member. “If
he doesn’t want it to work, there’s just no way. We’ve been fortunate to have that. He’s
there, but he’s not there. They’ve got to let you do it or it’s just not going to work.”
Facilitators do not dominate their teams, nor do they simply walk away and leave the
workers to fend completely for themselves.
Lessons Learned
Lean production has revolutionized the way managers and workers think about
manufacturing activities. Many companies in the US and Europe are attempting to adopt
the principles of lean production -- focusing on customer needs, relentlessly eliminating
wasted resources, continuously improving the process, and empowering shop floor
workers to participate in production decisions. Self-directed work teams offer an
excellent avenue by which companies can transform from a traditional mass production
environment to lean production. The self-directed team concept shares several important
principles with lean production teams -- teamwork, participation, flexibility,
empowerment, and cooperation. Self-directed teams, however, broaden the concept of
participation to include not only production tasks, but also the administrative and support
activities that traditionally fall under the exclusive purview of management or
engineering.
Texas Instrument Defense Systems & Electronics Group (TI DSEG) has
developed a highly successful program of self-directed work teams. This thesis explored
the implementation and organization of DSEG’s team initiative by presenting a case
study of two particular teams -- the Switch Filter/Beam Former Team and the Diamond
Point Turning Team. Both teams have achieved a high level of maturity and enjoyed
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great success as self-directed work teams; as a result, their collective experience offers
many valuable lessons and insights for other companies wishing to organize their own
self-directed teams. These lessons include the following:
• Continuous Improvement: Managers and workers must never lose sight
of the fundamental purpose of adopting self-directed work teams -- to
continuously improve the quality of manufacturing and business
processes. Eliminating defects, reducing costs, improving on-time
delivery performance, promoting safety, and providing stimulating work
not only add value for the customer and reward workers with greater job
satisfaction, but they also create wealth for the shareholders.
• Management Commitment: Implementing self-directed work teams is a
difficult and painful process. The success or failure of the initiative may
well depend on the degree of management commitment. Senior
managers need to provide the vision and active leadership, and middle
managers need to buy-in to the concept fully, to make the transition
happen.
• Motivated Workers: Likewise, the active participation of team members
demands a lot of hard work and persistence. Periodic setbacks will
inevitably hold up the transition, and only highly motivated workers will
show the persistence needed to stay on track.
• Overcoming Resistance to Change: Organizational change by its very
nature threatens the established order, and creates fear and discomfort
among workers and managers alike. The natural reaction of entrenched
interests and those who fear change is to resist. Proponents of change
must keep a constant vigil against subterfuge aimed at derailing the team
initiative.
• Appropriate Incentives: One of the most effective means of promoting
all of these efforts is to develop incentive structures that reward the right
behaviors and undermine resistance to change. Pay-for-knowledge, pay-
for-performance, excellence awards, business performance scorecards,
job performance evaluations -- any or all of these programs can provide
strong incentives that support the self-directed team concept.
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